

Christianity and Crisis

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Reporters and Interpreters

I MET a friend recently who had just listened to a report on England, made by a well known American clergyman after some weeks of travel on the Continent, and more briefly in England. This reporter had been exceedingly gloomy and pessimistic and had thoroughly disheartened the representative group of ministers and laymen to whom the report was given. One of the editors of a widely read religious journal has just published a similar estimate, with even darker conclusions regarding both England and the Continent. As for the latter there is, he insists, no health left either in state or church. Even the Provisional World Council of Churches, in his judgment, is primarily a "salvage" organization.

Because I find myself in sharp disagreement with both of these men, particularly in relation to England, the churches on the Continent, and the Provisional World Council of Churches, I am led to make some observations on reporters and interpreters.

Doubtless each man, in response to my dissent, would say: "The facts speak for themselves." How often we hear this cliché! Aldous Huxley gave the proper reply. "Facts," one of his characters remarks, "are ventriloquists' dummies. Sitting on a wise man's knee they may be made to utter words of wisdom; elsewhere they say nothing, or they talk nonsense, or indulge in sheer diabolism." Even if you have the facts there remains the question of interpretation.

But many interpretations are based on insufficient facts. It is well to remember John Stuart Mill's dictum that generalizations should not be attempted without having a sufficient degree of adjacent cases on which to base them. There may be other facts which have not been discovered or have been left out in coming to one's conclusions. From my own experience in two journeys to England this past spring and summer I think both of the reporters, already referred to, have either not seen certain facts which I saw, or have ignored them in their too gloomy generalizations. Both they and I may well profit by the wisdom of John Mason Brown. When making a report through the *Saturday Review of Literature*, Mr. Brown said: "Travel impressions

are as dangerous as they are unavoidable. Ask yourself how accurately you can gauge the feelings or happenings in your own town (much less your own country), and you realize how suspect such reports are." (Aug. 31, 1946)

Not now referring to the reporters with reference to whom I began this editorial, I am sure we all feel that there has been, and is, much reporting on the world scene which is "sheer diabolism," making for ill will, suspicion, and conflict. A famous European statesman at the San Francisco Conference said to the Consultants, representing the Protestant Churches there, that many of the "newsmen" at that critical Conference simply "sat around and drank whiskey and made mischief" by the unreliable and false reports they were sending out. Let us beware of such reports from the first Assembly of Nations!

Admittedly the world picture is a confused one, and may be viewed from many angles. When Isaiah's watchman was asked: "What of the night?" his reply was: "The morning cometh, and also the night. If ye will inquire, inquire ye." The light and the dark are to be found in every nation—even in the United States.

There is light and darkness in the struggle of the nations to find the path to an ordered world. Because of this mixed situation some view the Assembly of the United Nations with questioning, suspicion, cynicism, or actual hostility. Others believe that the Assembly, together with the other instruments of the United Nations, such as the Economic and Social Council, UNESCO, the Commission on Human Rights, the World Court, hold vast possibilities for the curing of our warring madness and the establishment of a freer and larger life for mankind. "If ye will inquire, inquire ye." Let the discussion go on, but let us not ignore the facts which give hope, as we give the facts which are fearfully disturbing.

One who assumes to be an interpreter carries a heavy social responsibility. Life is in the power of the word, and death also. Unconsidered and ill-advised or even inadequate speech or writing may do untold damage. So, too, the pessimist or the cynic

may take the heart out of many who would otherwise join with those who seek a new world.

We are in a battle with despair these days. One cannot but regret interpretations which weigh the

struggle on the side of defeat, especially when one's own judgment is that such interpretations leave out great areas of fact which give one the right to cherish hope.

JAMES C. BAKER.

The Atomic Negotiations

RICHARD M. FAGLEY

HISTORIANS of the future, if they can piece together the records of this century, are likely to find more significance in some rather quiet negotiations in New York than in the Conference of Paris or other highly publicized conferences. The negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission deal not with border disputes between the two worlds, but with central issues of our common insecurity. The fears engendered by the new weapons of mass destruction have intensified all the old antagonisms and have added new ones to the already abundant supply. No current development is of greater import for our world order strategy than the trend of the present negotiations.

Since a good deal of the committee work of the Atomic Energy Commission has been conducted in closed sessions, it is difficult for any outside observer to evaluate the proceedings. The exact shape of the iceberg under water can only be guessed. Nevertheless, the public part of the Commission proceedings permit some tentative judgments regarding the course of the negotiations.

The main judgment must be that the negotiations have been going badly, at least in terms of the short period of time in which conditions for world agreement are likely to be relatively favorable. The achievements of four months of work have given little or no assurance that the differences in this area which divide the Soviet and Western worlds can be overcome in time. The race for new weapons of mass destruction continues to mount.

Mr. Baruch presented the American proposals for world control of atomic power on June 14, nine months after the end of the war. The time lag in the evolution of American policy may well have tragic consequences, but at least the policy evolved offered a rational solution to the problem of control. In the main, it was based on the magnificent analysis of the Lilienthal Board. The plan proposed an International Atomic Development Authority, with managerial control or ownership of the initial dangerous phases of atomic development, and supervisory control of subsequent and relatively safe phases. The chief addition to the Lilienthal report made in Mr. Baruch's presentation was the stress on abolishing the Security Council veto in the enforce-

ment of "condign punishments" for violation of atomic controls.

The Soviet counter-proposals were presented by Mr. Gromyko five days later. It has been suggested that these were prepared before the American proposals were known. This is probably true, but since the Lilienthal report had been available for three months, and since the Soviet Union has continued to back its initial propositions, the point does not seem important. Mr. Gromyko proposed a kind of Kellogg-Briand pact to outlaw the use or manufacture of atomic weapons, and to destroy any existing weapons within ninety days from the ratification of the treaty. The only sanction suggested in the draft treaty was a provision for state punishment of violations. Since the chief potential criminals are these same states, the article hardly provides for an effective system of sanctions.

A hopeful interpretation of the Soviet statement is that it represents a fairly typical bargaining position. The statement highlighted those objectives of greatest concern to the Kremlin—to place moral and material restrictions on the American stockpile, to assure the continuance of Soviet atomic research and development, to secure any helpful information, and to maintain the legal protection of the veto. At the same time, the rather vague references, in the proposed agenda for the second committee, to "measures, systems, and organizations of control" and to "elaboration of a system of sanctions," seemed to leave the door open to agreement on an effective world authority, which is the major American concern. Men like Philip Noel-Baker expressed the belief that a compromise could be reached by combining the outlawry features of the Soviet proposal and the control features of the American plan.

The subsequent course of the negotiations throw grave doubts on any such hopeful interpretation, even though it cannot be ruled out wholly as a possibility. Certainly there appear to be no insuperable obstacles to the outlawry proposals. The American and other delegations have opposed, not outlawry, but rather outlawry "unsupported by effective guarantees." The proposal for destroying existing weapons seems a negotiable approach to the question of bomb disposal, provided such destruction is part of an agreed-

upon transition to adequate world control. Even the provision for national punishment of violations could be incorporated, if it furthered general agreement. In short, the Soviet proposals can generally be fitted into the Baruch-Lilienthal plan of control.

The rub is whether the reverse is also true, whether a world control plan is acceptable to the Russians. The evidence to date is not encouraging. The Commission delegates sought in vain to secure positive ideas from Mr. Gromyko on international controls and sanctions. The search evidently was carried on further in the less cumbersome and less public discussions of the Commission's Working Committee. The latter subsequently had to turn to two sub-committees. And the legal sub-committee decided to await the technical findings of the scientific sub-committee.

There was considerable doubt as to whether the Soviet scientist, Professor Alexandrov, would be able to sign the sub-committee's report on the technical possibilities of control, despite the fact that he had had a full part in its drafting. At the last minute, the signature was authorized, and unanimous agreement was reached. Nevertheless, in signing even this scientific report which excluded the controversial political questions, the Soviet representative qualified his approval by pointing to the "conjectural and conditional" nature of the conclusions, because of incomplete information.

Thus it is too early to see much hope in this first and elementary step forward. True, all twelve of the members of the legal sub-committee have agreed to consider possible controls at the danger spots pointed out in the report of the scientific committee. A second forward step is therefore conceivable. Yet this possibility must be weighed against the obstacles to agreement on any effective control plan.

The obstacles are ponderous. They are not, however, the difficulties cited by Mr. Wallace in his memorandum to the President. Mr. Wallace was under the impression, reinforced by an editorial in *Pravda*, that the United States proposed that this country would retain its discretion, after the atomic charter was signed, as to the time-table for bomb disposal and the sharing of information. The record and Mr. Baruch's rejoinder make it clear that the United States, as well as the other countries, would be bound, by the agreed-upon time-table, for the transition to world control. The various parts of the transition would be "wrapped up in one package" in the Commission negotiations, as Mr. Wallace hoped. Mr. Baruch said in his initial presentation that the stages of transition should be fixed in the charter. In the American memorandum of July 2 it was stated further that the treaty should contain provisions not only "governing the sequence and timing of the steps in the transition" but also "specifying the time when, and the conditions under

which, the national and private possession, manufacture, and use of atomic weapons shall be outlawed."

A more important difficulty may lie in the schedule of initial disclosures. The Lilienthal Board emphasized the responsibility of the United States to provide the members of the Commission at the outset with "the information essential to an understanding of the problem. . . . They must be in a position to evaluate alternatives. . . . Above all they must have a sound enough overall knowledge of the field as a whole to recognize that no relevant or significant matters have been withheld." The Lilienthal Board went on to express its conviction that further secret information, involving "almost nothing of know-how," should be shared to obtain the necessary insight. This feature of the plan seemed important not only as a means to establishing the necessary community of knowledge, but also as a means to establishing confidence in American intentions. The United States was to make the first leap of faith.

Mr. Baruch, in his initial presentation, expressed American willingness to "make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals." How far this has been carried out, however, in the growing atmosphere of suspicion and distrust is uncertain. Some further information on the constructive possibilities of atomic energy has been made public. Whether the information referred to by Mr. Lilienthal and his colleagues has been made available has not been stated. According to Thomas J. Hamilton in *The New York Times* of September 27, "Professor Alexandrov's reference to 'limited and incomplete information' available to the (scientific) committee, which prevented its conclusions from being final, was explained by the fact that the American delegation had emphasized throughout that no additional information, beyond that already published and available to everyone, would be provided." If this is true, the United States is responsible for a major obstacle to agreement.

The second major criticism by Mr. Wallace of the American proposals was directed at the "irrelevant" emphasis on the veto. He argued that the issue should not have been raised, since the major powers would all have a veto until a treaty is arrived at, and thereafter, in case of treaty violation, the remaining powers would be free to take such coercive action as they deemed necessary.

As a matter of fact, the American delegation itself appears to regard the veto issue as a secondary matter, and for much the same reasons as cited by Mr. Wallace. The delegation has continued to advocate that no veto in the Security Council be permitted "to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes." Restriction of the great-power veto would permit the establishment of punitive machinery within the U.N. framework. But the Amer-

ican delegation has also suggested an alternative procedure, namely to provide for sanctions outside the U.N., in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. That article reserves the right of individual or collective self-defense against aggression, and the U. S. delegates propose that violation of atomic controls be considered a form of aggression. Therefore, failure to achieve the maximum objective, restriction of the veto in the Security Council, would not be a fatal blow to the negotiations. The veto issue in this form is not a major obstacle.

The veto issue in another form, however, does seem to be central. This is the question of the voting procedure in the proposed Authority and in any body set up as a board of review. The atomic charter must be flexible enough to permit the I.A.D.A. to deal with unforeseen contingencies in specified areas. This means an important if limited delegation of power to the control agency. If that power is to be exercised effectively it cannot be hamstrung by a rule of great-power unanimity. Therefore the voting procedure of the Authority, and of any board of review, does offer a central problem in the negotiations.

The Soviet Union undoubtedly will seek to apply the Security Council formula to any control mechanism. The veto offers protection for her "minority" status. The United States will surely stand firm for a workable procedure of majority rule. Little has been said about this truly important aspect of the veto question, but the conclusion from the premises of the American plan appears inescapable. The delegation's memorandum of July 12 refers to Authority decisions which fall between the administrative level and the level of action against serious violations. These decisions might be subject to review by a special board, the memorandum states, and the latter's decisions "should be enforced by the Security Council as procedural matters." Mr. Baruch, in his statement of September 24, likewise stressed the removal of the veto as a possible hindrance to the day-to-day operations of the Authority.

Closely linked with this major issue is the fundamental problem of inspection. A central concern of the Lilienthal Board was to reduce the problem of inspection to manageable and tolerable terms. This objective was sought through concentrating inspection on the initial phase of atomic development, the mining of uranium and thorium ores. By a thorough and continuous geological survey, and by an international monopoly of successive dangerous phases of the process, the inspection service might be kept to a minimum and still be effective.

However limited inspection might be in practice, no system would produce confidence unless it were coupled with the right of unlimited access to investigate any suspected activity. Consequently, it would not be feasible to write into the atomic charter a set

of hard-and-fast rules governing the inspection system. Like the procedure of the I.A.D.A., the inspection procedure would have to remain flexible. This seems to be the source of the trouble. For a flexible inspection system might be misused to gather information relating to other strategic strengths or weaknesses. That possibility appears to be the source of Soviet opposition thus far to inspection. Mr. Gromyko stated flatly that a system of inspection as a means of control was "not in conformity with the sovereignty of states."

It would be premature to regard this rejection as a final and insuperable obstacle to agreement. It has been pointed out, for example, that Mr. Litvinov proposed inspection as a means of controlling armaments in 1927, at a time when the United States was opposed to any such "violation of national sovereignty." Furthermore, there is some indication that the Soviet Union is reconsidering its attitude to the inspection proposals. Professor Alexandrov has suggested the importance of supervising uranium and thorium resources and has made a helpful amplification of the American proposal on this point. This is regarded as the most hopeful development to date. At least it does not lock the door against agreement.

A corollary problem is the licensing function of the proposed Authority. Frederick Kuh stated in *PM* for September 26, that Soviet leaders fear most of all the possible injury to their economy from restrictions on atomic development decided upon under the licensing provisions of the Authority. Atomic power plants might be barred ostensibly on military grounds, but actually because of economic hostility. Any such policy would prevent the Soviet Union from utilizing to the full the constructive potentialities of nuclear fission. This is the trend of thinking among "highly placed and responsible Soviet authorities," Mr. Kuh reported from Washington.

It is difficult to tell how serious this problem may be. Expert opinions differ as to the amount of electrical energy which could be made available by uranium fission. The scientific sub-committee suggested figures ranging from 2,000,000 kilowatts to "several hundred million kilowatts," assuming a production of uranium no larger than in 1939. For purposes of comparison, the U. S. capacity in 1944 of about 62,000,000 kilowatts may be cited. On the whole, it is not unreasonable to suppose that atomic energy will become a very important source of power, particularly in desert areas and in ships.

Underlying all the other obstacles is the uncertainty as to Soviet objectives in the negotiations. The Soviet leaders may hope to delay the negotiations until they are able to make atomic weapons, either to bolster their bargaining position, or to dispense with the negotiations altogether. The possibility that the Soviet Government fears atomic con-

trols more than the threat of atomic war cannot be ruled out entirely. A more promising possibility is that the initial Soviet suspicions are gradually being overcome by continued study and discussion and by the improved Commission procedure.

Whatever the reasons, the slow pace of the negotiations tend to endanger their success. Every week that the United States continues to make weapons in secret, increases the difficulties of securing the con-

fidence in an inspection system applied to this country. Every week that the Soviet Union moves closer to atomic production, heightens the mutual fears and suspicions between the two worlds. And every week of delay tends to bring new weapons of mass destruction to the fore.

While the atomic negotiations have not been going well thus far, we can perhaps strengthen our patience by remembering that there is no tolerable substitute for their success.

Thoughts About the Soviet Union*

HERBERT WADDAMS

It is a difficult and often unfruitful occupation to discuss the Soviet Union in conversation. For many years there have been two main sets of opinion about the Soviet Union, one maintaining that it is a kind of heaven, and the other equally sure that it is a sort of hell. Upon anyone holding either of these views, reasonable argument has no effect, since his presuppositions are so firmly held and clearly shaped that his mind is not permitted to respond to normal appeals. Both these groups do much harm to the chance of understanding between the Soviet Union and the West, the former quite as much as the latter.

A chief cause of the wide difference of opinions on this topic is the extreme paucity of information which is available to persons outside Russia. The facts available are so few that they can be easily interpreted as desired, the difficulties being explained away in simple fashion. All those who hope for mutual understanding between the U.S.S.R. and other countries deplore this situation, which appears to them to indicate a short sighted policy on the part of the authorities, since it is unlikely that conditions are as bad as their enemies paint them. Doubtless neither are they as good as their *soi-disant* friends insist, but no loss would be sustained by a revelation of this fact, since many people react against their evident exaggerations.

Many of us still move in the atmosphere of the period between the two World Wars. From 1917 until 1941 the Soviet Union was largely isolated, and for this isolation the Western lands must take some responsibility. The rest of the world was content to adopt an attitude of condemnation, and failed to make any notable attempts to dissipate the hostility of their own peoples and the suspicion felt by the rulers of the U.S.S.R. An effort is needed to shake off preconceived ideas and to install a new objectivity of mental approach.

We live in the midst of history and are carried along by the powerful stream of historical development. Yet we are not like sticks or leaves on a river, for we are men with the power of detached thought and with scope for spiritual apprehension. This mental detachment

must be exercised in order to appreciate the historical processes which have led to the present and to enlighten our judgments of the actual situation. The Soviet Union and the Revolution have an immediate previous history of significance and also a more remote background from which spring many of the ideas and forces which exercise sway in the country today.

It is fatally easy to over-simplify any problem, and especially one in which facts are not readily accessible, and one moreover where words are used with varying meaning. In Britain and America the idea of democracy lies deep in their thinking, and is treasured beyond price. But the forms of democracy which Britons and Americans enjoy have sprung from many hundreds of years of experiment and experience: a certain wisdom is in the people because of this, even though it is for the most part unconscious. It is not necessary to probe very far back into British history to discover a state of affairs which would be abhorrent to the present generation.

In Russia the background is wholly otherwise. It is therefore not only foolish, but wrong, in our considerations of Russia to apply exacting standards which we have only hammered out after centuries of struggle, and civil war. Those who express a facile condemnation of the Soviet Union by stating that it is undemocratic, should ask themselves whether they could expect the British or American democratic systems to work in a country which covers one sixth of the earth's surface, which includes the vast and largely untouched spaces of Central Asia, which must make room in one State for the peoples of Turkestan, Northern Siberia, and the Far East, and the vast mass of whose peoples were illiterate and uneducated twenty-five years ago.

These are some of the thoughts which should be pondered before proceeding to any detailed examination of the present position. No attempt can be made in an article of this length to provide a detailed analysis. Christians must, however, be especially careful that their attitudes are free from bias, so far as it is humanly possible to achieve such a result, and it is incumbent upon them to refrain from condemnation without conclusive evidence. "Judge not that ye be not judged."

A complicating factor in the situation is the presence in most countries of Communist parties. There are several reasons why Communists abroad should not be

*The above considerations are not intended to provide a complete picture of the situation. The writer is fully aware of the darker shades which developments in Eastern Europe have produced and are still producing: his purpose has been simply to suggest that as many facts as possible should contribute to the knowledge on which any judgment is based, and that Christians should not be content to be carried along without question by the political passions of the day.

thought to mirror the state of affairs within the Soviet Union. Two of these reasons may be mentioned here, one material and the other spiritual. In the first place the milieu elsewhere is quite different from that inside the U.S.S.R. Generally speaking, Communist parties abroad exist in a state of struggle, which is absent from the country of their political origin, and the problems with which they must deal are quite different. Secondly, there is a spiritual tension in Communists abroad which has a deleterious effect on their character. Communists in the West have a divided loyalty, they must try to strike a balance between patriotism and obedience to Moscow. It is not merely a question of political maneuver, but reaches deep down into personal life. For those who are out and out traitors there is of course none of this tension, but many Communists do not go to this extreme.

The words of our Lord, "No man can serve two masters", has a relevance here. The result of trying to do so is self-deception, and loss of integrity and spiritual wholeness. In the Soviet Union there is no such inner strife.

In the U.S.S.R. today there are some striking qualities in the life of the people. There have also been great achievements which cannot pass unnoticed. Nobody can come into contact with Russians (the word is used here to describe all the various nationalities for which no satisfactory alternative exists), without recognizing an idealism which is both powerful and good. This is very evident in the educational field, in which great successes have been won for great numbers of people. Moreover many Russians have a remarkable sense of what we may call creative vocation. They feel that they are creating something together which is of lasting value, and which is in every way worthy of a lifetime's devotion.

In some of these spheres the Communist Russians have something to teach Christendom. One of the most striking failures of Christianity today is that the sense of vocation has been largely lost, except perhaps in the case of the Church workers. Most Christians, at any rate in Great Britain, have absolutely no sense of vocation from God in their ordinary work. Yet it is Christians above all who should exhibit this quality in their lives: in our failure we may learn.

Another significant experiment in Soviet Russia is the treatment of minorities. In this matter the pre-revolutionary policy has been reversed, and the minority groups are encouraged to maintain their language and to retain cultural autonomy. Thus a vigorous cultural life can be found in such republics as Soviet Armenia, which contributes its own special characteristics to the over-all cultural life of the Union. This is taking place at a time when some countries, which profess and call themselves Christian, have apparently admitted that they cannot live in peace with a minority of another tradition and language, which is also Christian.

Christians must bear all such considerations in mind, and others too. For good, or for ill, the neighboring countries are now linked closely with Russia politically. They have also many other ties of long standing: the Slav countries have a common origin and similar languages, the Orthodox Church forms another bond, and

history adds many more. When Christian people in Britain and America speak and act vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, they also affect, by their words and actions, the peoples of the Balkans, Hungary, Poland and the Baltic Republics. No word, and certainly no action, is without effect on the total situation and relationship: it is not a healthy attitude, to assume that Christians should speak according to certain high-flown principles, without carefully weighing the probable affects of what they do.

It is too easy to condemn the activities of the present regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe which make up the Soviet Bloc (it might be termed a *Cordon sanitaire*). However distasteful, and even unpopular, the regimes may be, they do represent something positive. In some degree at least, they reflect the failures of the former governments to adopt satisfactory policies and to put them into practice. They have been able to exploit these failures and to embody necessary reforms in their programs. Perhaps one must condemn what is wrong, but not without remembering what is right.

But the subject which is of the most interest to Christians abroad is naturally that of the position of the Christian religion in Soviet Russia. No more than a few points can be made here, and first some doubtful assumptions must be examined. Large numbers of people seem to assume that religious propaganda is altogether prohibited in the Soviet Union. So far as the present writer is aware, this is not the case so far as the Constitution is concerned. Here the guarantee is for freedom of religious worship and freedom for anti-religious propaganda. But freedom for anti-religious propaganda is not the same thing as prevention of religious propaganda, and should not be confused with it. In fact, of course, the amount of freedom depends largely on the way in which the law is administered, but it would be difficult to maintain that there is no freedom of this kind today. The Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church publishes a monthly official paper, "The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate." References to Church activities appear from time to time in the Press and on the radio. This does not appear to be prevention of religious propaganda.

It is also clear that the atmosphere of the Soviet Union today is far less anti-religious than it has been in the past. The militant godless seem to have disappeared and the publication of anti-religious papers has not been resumed since they were suppressed at the beginning of the war. No one in his senses imagines that the Soviet Union has become a Christian State, or that the authorities have been moved by Christian motives in their change of attitude. But the change is nevertheless important, since there is a great difference between an anti-religious State and a religiously neutral State. Secularist States have been known elsewhere, for instance in France.

The present condition of Christianity inside Soviet Russia seems to be quite healthy. The Orthodox Church is flourishing and has largely reorganized itself under the leadership of the Patriarch Alexei. No doubt they are short of priests, perhaps seriously short, but so is the Church of England, as are other Churches.

The Russian Church is making substantial plans for the resumption of theological education and training for the priesthood, and has reestablished its relations with other Churches all over the world, though this work is not yet completed. The Russian Church desires to have close and brotherly relations with the Church of England and the Anglican Communion, and has shown considerable interest in the activities of the World Council of Churches.

Anxiety is sometimes expressed by Christians about the relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Soviet State. In this connection it is important to appreciate certain differences of outlook between Eastern and Western Christendom. In the West, the problem of these relations has such a long and stormy history, that the theoretical distinction between Church and State is a basic mental attitude, even where the relations are closest. This is true of most countries, though perhaps not quite so clear in some Roman Catholic countries. In Orthodox countries, however, thought does not always follow this pattern. The Russian Orthodox see their Church as the spiritual expression of the Russian people. In this capacity it has limited religious functions and does not feel itself called upon to criticize the State. Indeed this idea would possibly appear completely strange to many Russian Orthodox. This is another point where it is misleading, simply to apply the categories of the West, to a totally dissimilar mental situation.

Christians of Britain and America have a plain duty toward Russian Christians. It must also be remembered that there are large numbers of Protestants, allied to the Baptists in practice and teaching, whose position also seems to be good. Christians elsewhere are bound to do their utmost to create a strong Christian fellow-

ship with the Christians of Soviet Russia. Few would deny that the creation of such fellowship is a primary Christian task about which the New Testament has a good deal to say, both in the Gospels and in the Epistles. In the world in which we live the chance of such fellowship is affected by many other factors besides the ideas of the Christians, who presumably desire to create it. It is a heavy responsibility to pursue courses of action whose probable result is to make such fellowship more difficult than it already is.

It is such thoughts as those outlined above which make it difficult for many Christians to follow the Vatican in its condemnations of Soviet Russia. The matter is not as simple as the condemnations make it appear. There may be some things which are disquieting to Christians, but I hope that they have noticed some disquieting features in their own countries too, for it is unlikely that there are none. It is not much good throwing away the dirty bath water if the baby is thrown away with it.

In these rather disconnected thoughts I have not made any attempt to consider the political tensions between Soviet Russia and the West which are so great a feature of international relations today, and which are in the thoughts of all those multitudes who are thirsting for peace and stability. I have only tried to suggest one or two considerations which should have a place in the minds of Christians when they are thinking about the Soviet Union. Christians should not allow themselves to be swept along on the tides of popular resentment and feeling, but should plant their feet firmly on the rock of fact and of Christian love. Only thus will the truth be discerned amidst the babels of conflicting opinions.

The World Church: News and Notes

Relief Needs in Germany

The many readers of *Christianity and Crisis* have made requests for further information in regard to the relief needs in Germany. The situation is that most of the relief being sent to Germany now comes from four organizations: the American Friends Service Committee; the Mennonites; the Church World Service, representing all other Protestant groups; and the Catholic Caritas.

The total amount of this relief is little more than sufficient to supply the needs of the religious and charitable institutions of Germany. One-half to two-thirds of the school children in the American zone have inadequate shoes for the winter, to mention only one item of desperate need. It is also very important to have much larger food shipments, so that the school children could have a supplemental meal.

In the absence of a general relief program in America, it is important that the churches assume much larger responsibilities than they have thus far assumed. The Church World Service has just made a report for the first year of its operation which reveals that the major denominations have made the following contributions in

total pounds: *Baptist* (North and South), 339,217 lbs.; *Church of the Brethren*, 647,309 lbs.; *Congregational Christian*, 163,672½ lbs.; *Evangelical and Reformed*, 218,437 lbs.; *Methodist*, 473,104 lbs.; *Presbyterian* (North and South), 485,398 lbs.; *Protestant Episcopal*, 172,695 lbs.

In order to understand the significance of these figures, it must be added that the small body of the American Friends Service Committee and the Mennonites equal or exceed in their contributions the total amount of the united Protestant churches. Here is an opportunity for Christian conscience to express itself in terms of much greater generosity, for the need is desperate.

Difficulties Facing Chaplains

Increased difficulties facing the chaplains with the occupying forces in the European Theatre of Operations and in the Pacific were described in reports presented at a meeting of the General Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains by two church leaders who have just returned from visits to these areas.

The churchmen are Dr. Samuel McCrea Cavert, General Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, who recently returned

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from two months in Germany, Austria, and France where he visited 150 chaplains; and Rev. C. Oscar Johnson of St. Louis, who talked with 250 chaplains in Japan, the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, and China. They went under appointment by the Chiefs of Chaplains of the Army and Navy with the approval of the Secretary of War.

The difficulties under which the chaplains now work are primarily caused by the lowered morale of the occupying troops, the extreme youth and immaturity of the replacement forces, both men pointed out.

"The present fact of plenty of leisure in a place where the steadying influences of the home community are far away has terribly accentuated the problems of drunkenness and sexual immorality," declared Dr. Cavert. "The venereal disease rate is shocking, having reached the highest point in the Army's history. The fact that this happens at a time when the Army has been giving increasing attention to medical prophylaxis is a striking indication of the inadequacy of medical measures in dealing with a moral issue. The chaplain represents, most clearly and positively, the forces that stand for moral character. If it was important for the

churches to stand behind him during the war, it is even more essential now."

However, he pointed out that in spite of all the demoralizing influences, the attendance at the Sunday services conducted by the chaplains compares favorably with church attendance at home.

Dr. Cavert also found an increased interest on the part of the chaplains in the development of the ecumenical spirit in the church. "Their experience in ministering to men of diverse religious backgrounds has given them an outlook that is more than denominational. . . . More than most of us, they are thinking of the Church not as a denominational or a national entity but as a Christian world community. We may expect the men who have served as chaplains to be an important influence in behalf of ecumenical unity in the Church."

Rules and Organizational Devices Will Not Guarantee Peace

No "rules and organizational devices" for international co-operation will guarantee peace without a moral renewal of mankind, Dr. Emil Brunner, Rector of the University of Zurich and Swiss Theologian, told a group of 400 Catholics, Jews and Protestants at the first meeting of the academic year of the Institute for Religious and Social Studies.

According to Dr. Brunner, the disintegration of the idea of human dignity in the modern world is the result of a similar disintegration of the Biblical idea of God. In the fact of this disintegration is the root of modern conflict and hate, he asserted. "There exists a close connection, for example, between the inhumanity and lawlessness of totalitarianism and its frankly professed atheism."

The theologian took sharp issue with those who found the solution of this "terrifying problem" in a simple educational process. "Education must fail," he said, "as long as it does not uncover the source of moral forces. The foundation of morality, a sense of responsibility, finds its dynamic power only in relation to the Divine."

He denied morality existed apart from belief in a personal God and termed such belief a "tragic illusion."

"As in the past, moral renewal cannot come in our time but from a reaffirmation of the ultimate authority of life."

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